Gary North’s REALITY CHECK
Gold’s price:
www.GaryNorth.com/snip/300.htm
The Federal debt:
www.GaryNorth.com/snip/544.htm
To subscribe to this letter:
www.snipurl.com/subscribenow
Issue 756 May 23, 2008
WHEN SKOUSEN GAVE FRIEDMAN A LESSON IN MONETARY THEORY
The story you are about to read is true. The names
have not been changed to protect the innocent. But first,
a little background material is called for.
The Federal Reserve System was granted a monopoly over
monetary policy on December 23, 1913, when the Senate voted
to pass the House’s bill, which had been passed on December
22. President Wilson signed the bill into law that
evening.
Ever since that fateful day, economists have done
their best to get their opinions on monetary policy
accepted by the FED. The only exception to this
generalization is the Austrian School of economics. Their
members, who are few in number and are generally without
influence, do not believe that a government-licensed
monopoly is capable of setting monetary policy without
distorting the free flow of capital, especially the most
crucial form of capital: information. So, they do not
attempt to influence staff economists at the FED. They
know it is a waste of time.
RIVAL SCHOOLS OF OPINION
There are several views of how monetary policy should
be conducted. The most famous view is that of Milton
Friedman. He argued for decades that the gold standard is
a waste of gold, since governments must store gold in
vaults. This valuable commodity could be used for
productive purposes.
He wanted every nation’s central bank to produce money
at all times at a constant rate. He never decided on a
rate. He suggested a range: 3% to 5% per annum. This view
was the conservative opinion when I was in graduate school.
Keynesian economists argue for monetary policy to
accompany fiscal policy. It must be subservient to fiscal
policy. The central bank should partially finance
government deficits in times of economic recession, when
governments are supposed to run massive deficits. The
central bank should buy government debt with newly created
money. Its staff economists should decide which rate of
inflation is the best at any given time.
This is also pretty much the view of supply-side
economists, who argue that government deficits don’t
matter. They recommend reduced marginal income tax rates
and corporate tax rates, but they almost never argue in
public during a recession that the government should also
cut spending to match reduced taxation. They also do not
argue that the central bank is unwise to expand money in a
recession. As long as marginal tax rates are cut, they
don’t care much about monetary policy. A few of them call
for a strange kind of gold standard, one which doesn’t
issue money that allows everyone to demand payment in gold
by the Federal government at a price fixed by law. Why, I
don’t know. It is a pseudo-gold standard.
These groups agree on one thing: there should never be
a central bank policy of monetary contraction. This means
that the central bank should never sell government debt
without purchasing an offsetting asset of some kind.
This is the monetary ratchet. The money supply never
falls. Whenever it rises, due to central bank policy, this
increase becomes permanent.
Austrian School economists are in fundamental
opposition to all three majority schools of opinion. They
believe that money should be private, that contracts
promising to pay in a monetary unit of account should be
enforced, that no bank should be given a monopoly by the
government, and that the public should decide what
constitutes money through their dealings, not through
legislative fiat. The civil government should get out of
money production altogether.
To illustrate the conflict between the Austrian School
and the Chicago School, Mark Skousen designed a test. I
was present when he conducted this test — or, as the case
may be, sprang the trap. I reprint the following without
alteration.
I sent this document to Skousen on the day I wrote it.
He agreed with me at the time that this account is an
accurate summary of what he did and why.
SKOUSEN’S TEST OF MONETARY THEORY
I am writing this on October 17, 1998
On the evening of October 15, I went out to dinner
with Mark Skousen, Van Simmons, and Milton and Rose
Friedman. It was at Mark’s invitation. We went to the
Commander’s Palace in New Orleans. We were in town for the
annual Blanchard Seminar.
Mark had arranged to have Van Simmons bring a U.S.
gold coin, dated 1912, which was Milton Friedman’s year of
birth. He is in the rare coin business. It had been hard
to locate. The year is rare. He had it send from
Switzerland by Federal Express overnight that same day.
The Swiss contact had only one such coin.
Before the evening had gone more than a few minutes,
Friedman brought up the issue of our (the Austrians’)
ideological commitment to the gold standard. The fact is,
there is no ideological commitment to the gold standard
among Austrian economists, since they don’t think the
government should have any monetary standard except for tax
payments. They do not think governments should be in the
money-production business. Mises believed in free banking.
Rothbard believed in 100% reserve banking, as does
Friedman’s economist brother-in-law, Aaron Director. As to
which metal the free market adopts as its monetary
standard, the Austrian doesn’t care, although he thinks
gold is the most likely for international trade. Silver is
second.
The important thing for the Austrian is that there be
no legal tender laws and no price control schemes setting
the exchange rate of one currency or metal in relation to
another. There should be no legal compulsion over money,
other than to enforce contracts. The Rothbardians do argue
that the fractional reserve system is fraudulent and
therefore should be prohibited. But their problem is:
Prohibited by whom? They do not believe in the State.
Friedman had said at least twice that he did not
understand why there is an ideological commitment to gold
by us, meaning Mark and me. Perhaps 15 minutes later, Mark
brought out an old $20 gold paper note, issued by the
government (pre-1913). It was a written contact: to pay
gold to the bearer. He asked Milton to pull out a $20 bill
and read the contact. It makes no such promise.
Then Mark took Friedman’s bill and tore it up. Milton
looked at the bill’s remains, lying on the table. He was
silent at first. Mark then handed him the $20 gold piece.
But Friedman pushed it away. “I don’t want it. I want the
$20. I didn’t authorize you to tear it up.” This was of
course true. But there had been compensation economically,
at about 30 to one.
Mark was trying to make a point about broken
contracts: the government’s abandonment of gold pre-1934
gold contracts. The point was lost on Friedman.
Friedman then said it was wrong to tear up a $20 bill,
because doing so passed some appreciation to all other
holders of paper money. In theory, this is correct.
Empirically, it would be impossible to measure or prove.
After a few minutes, Friedman calmed down. Mark had
to give him a replacement $20 bill to calm him down.
Friedman did like the coin, with his birthdate on it. He
decided to keep it.
What struck me after the dinner was over was
Friedman’s ideological commitment to paper money. A $600
coin was nothing; that lost $20 bill was everything. The
tearing up of that bill was almost like an act of sacrilege
in his eyes. The coin did not compensate him. Only a
replacement bill did.
He has spent his career arguing for paper money and
against a metallic standard. Before the coin incident, he
had repeated several times his old argument that digging up
metal is a waste of scarce resources. He has never
understood that the costs of digging up metal — that
portion of gold used for money rather then jewelry or
industry — in the legal world of a gold standard is a very
cheap way for society to restrict governments from
inflating. If governments are in the money production
business, then they should be limited by the costs of
producing the money metals. These costs chain their lust
for spending fiat money and avoiding direct taxation.
Men often do not see their own ideological
commitments. They see only their opponents’ ideologies.
I shall not publish this report in Friedman’s
lifetime. He has done yeoman service in battling price
controls and taxation. No need to embarrass him. But in
money matters, he was ideologically committed to the State
as the final arbiter of money. He just wanted the
bureaucrats to run the system by his recommended 3% to 5%
increase in money per year. They refused.
– end of report –
WHAT IS THE SOLUTION?
The solution is freedom. I have outlined the solution
in my 1987 book, “Honest Money.” You can download it here.
www.garynorth.com/public/512.cfm
The free market can be trusted in monetary affairs.
Anyone who defends the free market in most areas of the
economy and then insists that the civil government can be
trusted to conduct a fair and efficient monetary policy
needs to explain his reasons. I have found that the
economists who defend central banking do not explain why a
cartel in banking is in the public interest but cartels in
every other area of the economy are not in the public
interest.
The most free market oriented of all first-year
college economic textbooks is the one written by Gwartney
and Stroup. This is the only one written by members of the
“public choice” school of economics, which is famous for
arguing that every government employee is governed by the
same self-interest as anyone else, including capitalists.
In the 4th edition (1987), we read:
Central banks are charged with the responsibility
of carrying out monetary policy. The major
purpose of the Federal Reserve System (and other
central banks) is to regulate the money supply
and provide a monetary climate that is in the
interest of the entire economy (p. 281).
The authors then devote ten pages of text to a
description of the operations of the FED, without one word
of criticism, and openly denying the private legal status
of the system: “In reality, it would be more accurate to
think of the Fed and the executive branch as equal partners
in the determination of policies designed to promote full
employment and stable prices” (p. 283). Equal partners? I
have a few questions.
What happened to Congress, which the Constitution
assigns exclusive power over the purse?
What happened to the laws of economics?
What happened to self-interest?
What happened to the economic analysis of
monopoly, which the authors apply to every other
area of the economy?
The authors do not even hint at the possibility that
any of these issues is relevant. They continue.
Public enterprises can thus be expected to use at
least some of their monopoly power, not to
benefit the wide cross-section of disorganized
taxpayers and consumers, but as a cloak for
inefficient operation and actions to advance the
personal and political objectives of those who
exercise control over the firm. Government
ownership, like unregulated monopoly and
government regulation, is a less ideal solution.
It is not especially surprising that those who
denounce monopoly in, for instance, the telephone
industry seldom point to a government-operated
monopoly — such as the Post Office — as an
example of how an industry should be run (pp.
466-67).
The authors by this stage in their textbook had
already pointed to just such a government monopoly (as they
incorrectly and misleadingly defined it), the most powerful
and profitable monopoly of all, the monopoly over money
creation and monetary policy: central banking. They
discussed the FED in Chapter 12, “Money and the Banking
System” before they presented Chapter 19, “Monopoly and
High Barriers to Entry.”
The authors expect the reader to fail to notice this
theoretical discontinuity, as if there were some economic
justification of the inapplicability of Chapter 19’s
analysis to Chapter 12. This is a safe assumption. Most
students do not notice. Neither does Congress.
If there is any area of the economy that cannot safely
be trusted to the government or a government-licensed
central bank it is monetary affairs. This is licensed
counterfeiting. The authority to counterfeit money to
increase government purchases — through the sale of
government debt — will be misused.
The best book on this is by Jesus Huerta de Soto,
“Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles” (2006), published
by the Mises Institute. You can download it for free here,
but it’s wise to buy it in hardback.
www.mises.org/Books/desoto.pdf
SOVEREIGNTY
The intellectual battle over monetary theory is
ultimately a battle over the issue of sovereignty. Which
agency possesses lawful sovereignty — a final say — over
the operation of the monetary system?
The answer of the vast majority of economists is this:
the state. They believe that sovereignty over money is an
inherent aspect of civil government. But they never admit
to their readers that sovereignty is the supreme issue, nor
do they admit that they have taken a stand in favor of
state sovereignty. They never discuss the reasons for
their commitment to state sovereignty in monetary affairs.
They also do not use the argument for efficiency. Why
not? Because in the rest of their writings, they have
exposed the fallacy of the concept of government
efficiency. It would be difficult for them to make the
case for a cartel as the preferred engine of efficiency.
What remains? Ethics. They must show that, because
of the issue of right and wrong, of good vs. evil, the
state must have a monopoly over money, and not just a
monopoly, but a transferable monopoly. They must show
that the cartel of profit-seeking counterfeiters has a
moral claim of this delegated sovereignty over money. They
never do this. They never raise the issue of ethics in
money.
There is one exception: Murray Rothbard. He placed
ethics front and center in his discussion of monetary
policy. His textbook on money and banking, “The Mystery of
Banking,” is the only textbook by an economist that does
this. This is one reason why no college or university has
assigned in over two decades. You can download it here.
www.mises.org/Books/mysteryofbanking.pdf
Rothbard showed why the cartel over money is immoral.
He also showed why it is inefficient, if by “efficient” we
mean “not inflating, not creating recessions, and not
redistributing wealth from the those who trust the
government to skeptics who know the game is rigged against
the common man.”
CONCLUSION
We do not have a free market in money. We have a
self-interested cartel. This cartel will do whatever it
can to protect its lucrative monopoly over money.
You would be wise to assume, as in all other areas of
the economy, that the following offer is suspect:
“I’m from the government, and I’m here to help
you.”